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Article 6

SILVER LININGS IN FEDERAL CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM
Carl Tobias*
INTRODUCTION

Many observers, including most of the participants in the
civil litigation symposium, have levelled considerable criticism
at the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA" or "Act") and
its implementation. This criticism-which encompasses numerous phenomena, as abstract as constitutional theory and as
pragmatic as numerical limitations on interrogatories-emanates from several quarters and ranges across the
political spectrum. For example, one respected commentator
has strongly argued that the statute violates constitutional
separation of powers and predicted that the legislation will
change civil procedure as it has existed for the last half-century.' Some individuals involved in federal civil litigation, including members of the federal bench, have suggested that political
factors substantially affected the measure's enactment.2 Numerous critics believe that the statute was unnecessary or illconceived because, for example, it focuses too narrowly on

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan and
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton
for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support.
Errors that remain are mine.
1 See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]; see also
Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993).
2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Call
for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993); Avern Cohn, A Judge's View of
Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (1991);
Lauren KL Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 115 (1991). At a recent Advisory Committee hearing, an attorney
who represents defendants in products liability cases disclaimed any effort to
speak for all such defendants. Judge Ralph Winter, a Committee member, reportedly responded that the lawyer did not need to because Senator Biden had already
done so in the CJRA.
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reducing expense and delay in civil litigation.3 Others assert
that Congress may have failed either to think completely
through the legislation's effectuation or to provide sufficient
guidance for its implementation.4
Most of these concerns have more specific manifestations.
One is that Congress afforded minimal information on such
critical matters as whether the ninety-four federal district
courts could adopt local procedures that conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules").5 Moreover, certain of the institutions that Congress created to effectuate the
Act, such as Advisory Groups named in each district, or to
monitor its implementation, such as Circuit Review Committees, replicate existing entities, namely local rules committees
and Circuit Judicial Councils, or have unclear responsibilities.6 Furthermore, Congress may have structured these institutions in ways that impair their effectiveness. For instance,
Advisory Groups consisting principally of attorneys who practice before the judges in specific districts might understandably
be reluctant to challenge the views of those judges, while Circuit Review Committees" similarly may be reticent to criticize
civil justice plans that their colleagues in other districts have
prepared.'
Some observers have criticized the federal districts' effectuation of the CJRA. In a number of districts, advisory groups
apparently have a less balanced composition than Congress
contemplated. Certain groups are comprised substantially of
defense counsel or interests, such as employees of large corporations, who dominated civil justice planning,' or consist of too

' See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 2, at 100-04; Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 879 (1993); see also Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 1, at 392.
4 See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 2, at 100-04; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1402-22
(1992).
' See, e.g., Lauren Y, Robel, FracturedProcedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994); see also Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 1; see infra notes 11, 41 & 65-68 and accompanying text.
6 See Robel, supra note 3, at 891; Tobias, supra note 4, at 1403-13; see also
Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992).
See Tobias, supra note 4, at 1403-13; see also Rebel, supra note 3, at 900.
8 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
INDIANA, REPORT AND PROPOSED PLAN OF THE CiVI JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADvISORY GROUP i (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter S.D. IND. REPORT]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT
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few non-lawyers, who contributed minimally.9 In other districts, the federal judges have apparently exercised more influence in civil justice planning than might have been appropriate
or they were unresponsive to the reports and recommendations
that their Advisory Groups developed." Quite a few districts
have adopted local procedures that conflict with the Federal
Rules, and one court even declared that its provisions took
precedence over the Federal Rules."
Numerous districts have prescribed procedures that may
not reduce, and could even increase, expense and delay, thereby inverting the expressly stated purpose of the CJRA. For
example, all elements of the organized bar so vociferously
opposed a pre-discovery disclosure mechanism adopted by a
number of districts that Congress nearly refused to permit its
national application. 2
Finally, many of the reform developments in civil litigation, especially those in the two paragraphs immediately
above, have increased procedural disuniformity and complexity
in the ninety-four federal districts, thus additionally fragmenting civil procedure. 3 Indeed, the quantity and pace of recent
reform activity have prompted calls for moratoria on the revision of Federal Rules pending an evaluation of current CJRA
experimentation, 4 and even for a moratorium on all reform
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMiNG, ADVISORY GROUP REPORT AND RECOMMEND-

ED PLAN, at frontispiece (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter D. Wyo. REPORT].
9 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA,
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP, at frontispiece (Aug.

1991) [hereinafter D. MONT. REPORT] (few non-lawyers); Richard L. Marcus, Of

Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
761 (1993) (non-lawyer quit participating).
10 These assertions are premised on conversations with many individuals involved in civil justice reform. Numerous judges did not adopt a number of their
Groups' recommendations, and some offered no explanations.
" See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9 (Dec. 20, 1991) (plan takes

precedence) [hereinafter E.D. TEX. PLAN]; see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 1417
(providing other examples of conflicting procedures).

12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431-36 (1993); see
also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
" See generally Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 1; Tobias, supra
note 4.
" See, e.g., Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 3, 1992); Bryan J. Holzberg, Judicial Conference Approves Amendments to Civil Rules, 18 LITIG.
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efforts. 5
Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms that observers
have lodged at the statute and its effectuation, a number of
which have considerable validity, the federal reform initiative
has afforded many advantages. Unfortunately, these benefits
have received comparatively little recognition. Because the
reform's salutary aspects could improve the civil justice system, they warrant analysis. This essay undertakes that effort
by emphasizing the most important beneficial features of implementation to date. 6 Part I of this Article examines the origins and development of the CJRA. Part
II then analyzes the
17
advantageous dimensions of the reform.
I.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT
The origins and development of the CJRA warrant comparatively brief examination here, as they have been comprehensively treated elsewhere." Congress passed the Act out of
growing concern about the litigation explosion, litigation
abuse-particularly during discovery-and decreasing federal
court access." Since the mid-1970s, many federal judges had
been arguing that there was a litigation explosion and mounting abuse of the litigation process." Congress sought to im-

NEWS 10 (Dec. 1992) (ABA Litigation Section recommendation calling for moratorium).
' See Burbank, supra note 2, at 841.
16 I deemphasize the statute because all ninety-four districts are now implementing the measure, and Congress seems unlikely to amend the legislation. See
generally Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United:" The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 105 (Summer 1991); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993).

" I do not treat Executive Branch civil justice reform because it has received
little implementation. See generally Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice
Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521 (1993).
18 See, e.g., Peck, supra note 16, at 109-12; Robel, supra note 2, at 115; Carl
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507, 508 (1992).
",See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802, 6804-05. See generally Peck, supra note 16.
20 See, e.g., National Hockey League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427
U.S. 639, 640 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 74041 (1975); Dissent from Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446
U.S. 997, 1000 (1980).
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prove the federal civil justice system by encouraging reform
"from the bottom up."2 ' Congress envisioned that increasing
dialogue among federal judges and federal court practitioners
and litigants would lead to the development of procedures that
could reduce cost and delay and be acceptable to all participants in the reform process and in federal civil litigation.
The statute required every one of the ninety-four federal
districts to have issued civil justice expense and delay reduction plans by December 1993.22 The purposes of the plans are
to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and
ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."' The courts were to issue the plans after Advisory
Groups tendered reports and recommendations to the districts.24
The statute requires these Groups, which the districts
appointed ninety days after the CJRA's enactment, to be "balanced," including lawyers and others representative of litigants
who participate in civil suits in the courts. The Act commands every Advisory Group to analyze comprehensively the
"state of the court's civil and criminal dockets," to "identify
trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the
court's resources" and to designate the "principal causes of cost
and delay in civil litigation" in the district.26 The statute directs each Group, in developing recommendations, to consider
the specific circumstances and needs of the district, its parties
and their attorneys while insuring that all three contribute
significantly to "reducing cost and delay and thereby facilitating access to the courts."2 7
The judges, after receiving the Groups' reports and suggestions, considered them, conferred with the groups and then
considered whether to prescribe the Act's eleven principles,
guidelines and techniques and any other measures that they

See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 19, at 14-16; Peck, supra note 16, at 110.
' See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp.
II 1992).
See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1992).
21

24 See id. § 472.

See id. § 478(b).
23 See id. § 472(c)(1).
21

2

See id. § 472(c)(1)-(3).
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believed would decrease delay or cost.28 Thirty-four districts
complied with these requirements by December 31, 1991, and
the Judicial Conference officially designated them Early Implementation District Courts ("EIDC"),29 while the remaining sixty districts adopted civil justice plans between that date and
December 1993.20
II.

BENEFICIAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

This Part examines the advantageous ramifications of the
federal reform by tracing the steps that the CJRA prescribes
for implementation. It examines the beneficial aspects of the
courts' appointment of Advisory Groups and the Groups' efforts
to discharge their statutory duties to assess the districts and to
compile reports and recommendations. It also analyzes the
districts' consideration of these reports and suggestions and
consequent adoption of civil justice plans, various entities'
oversight of those plans and the courts' implementation and
evaluation of the procedures included in the plans. At each
stage of the process, the Article affords specific examples derived from experimentation in the federal districts. It then
evaluates certain ancillary advantages of the process.31
A. Direct Beneficial Aspects of the PlanningProcess
1. Composition of Advisory Groups and Communications
Most of the federal districts appointed Advisory Groups
that were "balanced," especially in terms of representation of
2 See id. §§ 472(a), 473(a)-(b). The principles, guidelines and techniques principally govern judicial case management, discovery and ADR.
29 See, e.g., Letter to Hon. Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States
District Court for the District of Oklahoma, from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference
of the United States (July 30, 1992); Letter to Hon. Paul G. Hatfield, Chief
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Montana, from Robert M.
Parker, Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (July 30, 1992); see also Tobias, supra
note 6, at 56 (listing EIDCs).
'0 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. II 1992).
"1 I attempt to analyze both the processes employed and the results produced.
My analysis of the processes is premised principally on conversations with numerous participants in civil justice reform.
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various segments of the organized bar." For instance, numerous courts included in Advisory Groups similar numbers of
attorneys who were members of the "plaintiffs' bar" and of the
"defense bar."33 Most districts also attempted to appoint non-

lawyers who were representative of litigants, and some tried to
encourage considerable participation by the non-lawyers. A few
districts balanced the number of resource-poor parties with
who represent interests that possess greater reindividuals
34
sources.

Numerous districts instituted special efforts to foster communications between the groups and local rules committees,
which the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act required that
courts establish to routinize and open the local revision process
while limiting the adoption of inconsistent local procedures.35
For example, numerous judges and Groups attempted to keep
the committees fully apprised of their reform endeavors by
supplying them draft reports and recommendations, holding
joint meetings of the entities and seeking the committees'
assistance in proposing new local procedures. Some districts
appointed several members of their local rules committees to
the Groups,36 while the Southern District of Indiana simply
designated the committee as its advisory group.3

32 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON viii (Jan. 1993).
.4 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY,
App. A (Sept. 1, 1993) [hereinafter E.D. KY. REPORT]; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
GROUP FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE,
App. A (Feb. 1, 1993).
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2077 (Supp. II 1992). See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 854 (1991); Tobias, supra note 4, at 1399-1401.
"' See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra. note 9, at frontispiece; REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF

1990 AND RECOMMENDED PLAN ii (Dec. 10, 1992) [hereinafter M.D.N.C. REPORT].
", See S.D. IND. REPORT, supra note 8, at i.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 59:857

Advisory Group Efforts

Practically all of the Advisory Groups undertook thorough
analyses of conditions in their districts. The groups scrutinized
the courts' civil and criminal dockets, delineated trends in
filings and in demands imposed on the districts' resources,
identified the primary sources of expense and delay in civil
litigation and considered how these might be minimized with
improved assessment of the legislation's effects on the
courts."8
Numerous Advisory Groups surveyed their bars, interviewed their judicial officers and court personnel and consulted
other federal districts and state courts, especially within their
own jurisdictions when designating causes of cost and delay
and means of remedying or ameliorating them.3 9 In formulating suggestions, nearly every Group apparently considered the
particular needs and circumstances of the court, its litigants
and their counsel while guaranteeing that each contributed
significantly to decreasing expense and delay and to facilitating court access. °
Most of the Groups compiled thorough reports and recommendations, which included all of the statutorily required
information enumerated above and much additional instructive
material relating to their districts' functioning. For example,
some groups were very sensitive to issues of judicial authority,
and the Middle District of North Carolina Advisory Group
included a careful analysis of those questions in its report.41

'
See, e.g., D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA 8-30 (Aug. 1, 1991), reprinted in 138 F.R.D. 167, 190-212 (1991).
"' For helpful examples of surveys, see REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII 26 (May 12,
1993) [hereinafter D. HAW. REPORT]; M.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 36, at 141;
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORm ACT ADVISORY GROUP REPORT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH
DAKOTA, App. C (Dec. 31, 1992) [hereinafter D.S.D. REPORT]; see also 28 U.S.C. §
472(c)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1992).
41 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 17-19 (July 9, 1993)
[hereinafter W.D.N.C. REPORT]; D.S.D. REPORT, supra note 39, at 44-46; see also
28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(3) (Supp. II 1992).
41 See M.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 36, at 110-11; see also infra notes 65-68
and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the
Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89, 107-10 (1993).
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The Groups developed suggested solutions that were tailored to the particular difficulties that they found. Some
groups determined that changes were unnecessary, and recommended minimal, if any, reforms. These groups found that
their districts were experiencing little cost or delay that was
amenable to amelioration or were already applying procedures
that decreased expense or delay, including the congressionally
prescribed principles, guidelines and techniques. 2 But other
Groups proposed more comprehensive change upon ascertaining that their districts had encountered considerable cost or
delay, which apparently could be reduced by procedures not
currently in use. Indeed, numerous groups recommended
that districts adopt a host of mechanisms that could decrease
expense or delay. Some of the procedures were innovative or
relatively untested, others were premised on identical or similar measures that had previously proved effective in limiting
cost or delay, in other federal districts or in state courts, and
most were based on the congressionally delineated principles,
guidelines and techniques."
Illustrative of rather novel procedures was the Central
District of California Advisory Group's suggestion that its court
experiment assigning numerous judges only criminal cases for
one year to expedite civil dispute resolution. Another Group
recommended that its district create peer review committees of
federal bar members to which judicial officers could submit
discovery disputes for advice.46 A questionnaire that the East42

See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR

THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 50-67 (Oct. 25, 1991); REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM

ACT ADVISORY

GROUP FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF VIRGINIA 53-65

(Sept. 19, 1991); see also D.S.D. REPORT, supra note 39, at 17.
1 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 61-103 (Mar. 19, 1993) [hereinafter C.D. CAL. REPORT]; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (Oct. 1991).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. II 1992) (principles, guidelines and techniques).

See generally Tobias, supra note 4, at 1418-22.
"5 See C.D. CAL. REPORT, supra note 43, at 65-68; ef UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY

GROUP REPORT 51-52 (Apr. 1993) (suggesting splitting criminal and civil dockets
among judges).
41 See D. MONT. REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; see also Carl Tobias, Federal
Court Procedural Reform in Montana, 52 MONT. L. REV. 433, 449 (1991). See generally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91
(1992).
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ern District of California Advisory Group circulated to federal
court practitioners indicated a valuable technique for decreasing the time that lawyers spent at the court house waiting to
argue motions: the staggered scheduling of law and motion
matters by specially setting or scheduling at the end of the
motion calendar lengthy proceedings.47 Several Groups urged
that their districts adopt procedures for streamlining the disposition of summary judgment motions.4"
Some Groups premised suggestions on efficacious measures instituted in other districts or by state judges. The South
Carolina Advisory Group drew on an expedited tracking mechanism employed in the Western District of Texas49 when proposing that the South Carolina federal judges implement a
similar mechanism." The Group also recommended the adoption of a settlement week analogous to one successfully used in
the South Carolina state court system.5 ' The Connecticut Advisory Group concomitantly suggested that the district create a
joint federal-state alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
scheme for providing alternatives to traditional civil litigation." These and related proposals for modelling federal procedures on state analogues apparently represent efforts to capitalize on the profession's familiarity with particular procedures
and to realize savings, for instance, by drawing on a readily
available source of ADR providers.53
1

47 See REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 81, 95,
97 (Nov. 21, 1991); see also UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5-6
(Dec. 31, 1991).
48 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990,
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 33-36 (Dec. 23, 1991); D. MONT. REPORT, supra
note 9, at 81-83. See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Western
District of Missouri, 58 MO. L. REV. 335, 347 (1993)..
"s See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 6-7 (Nov. 30, 1992).
" See FINAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR
THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 37-39 (July 29, 1993) [hereinafter D.S.C. REPORT].
" Id. at 55-58; see also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
52 See REPORT AND PLAN OF CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP FOR

THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 14-17 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter D. CONN. REPORT].

" The federal and state courts often look to one another in the area of civil
justice reform. Indeed, Congress premised a number of the eleven CJRA principles,
guidelines and techniques on analogous state procedures. See S. REP. No. 416,
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Practically all of the Groups called on their courts to prescribe various combinations of the eleven principles, guidelines
and techniques, especially those that involve judicial case management, discovery and ADR. Many Groups suggested some
type of case management with ongoing judicial participation
through management and discovery plans, conferences and
additional mechanisms. 4
Almost every Advisory Group recommended reforms in
discovery, a number of which were based on new Federal Rules
amendments or the measures in the CJRA 5 For example,
numerous Groups proposed that districts adopt automatic
disclosure or presumptive restrictions on numbers of interrogatories or depositions. 6 Other Groups suggested that their
courts require litigants to certify that they had attempted to
resolve discovery disputes before filing motions."
Nearly all of the Advisory Groups recommended that the
districts experiment with multiple forms of alternatives to
dispute resolution. These ranged across a broad spectrum from
traditional options, such as mediation, to recently invented
possibilities, such as court-annexed arbitration, to very new
alternatives, namely early neutral evaluation ("ENE"), summary jury trials and settlement weeks.5"
Finally, many Advisory Groups offered a number of suggestions for reducing delay and expense which were primarily

supra note 19, at 19, 21, 23-27; see also ROBERT E. LITAN (THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION)

& MARK H.

GITENSTEIN (THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE), JUSTICE FOR

ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 15-17, 29 (1989).
'4 See, e.g., UNITED STATES
PI, ADVISORY

GROUP

REPORT

DISTRICT
AND

COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIP-

RECOMMENDED

PLAN

1-19

(Aug. 20,

1993);

W.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 40, at 2047; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1)-(3) (Supp.
II 1992).
1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 28-34, 36-37, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431-73
(1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 473(a)(3)-(5), (b)(1), (3) (Supp. II 1992).
" See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF IOWA 8-9 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter N.D. IOWA REPORT]; D. MONT.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 73-75; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (Supp. H 1992);
supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., W.D.N.C. REPORT, supra note 40, at 44; REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 68-69 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter M.D. PA. REPORT]; see also 28
U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (Supp. II 1992).
"

See, e.g., D. CONN. REPORT, supra note 52, at 14-16; D.S.C. REPORT, supra

note 50, at 53-64; see also 28 U.S.C. 99 473(a)(3)(A), (a)(6), (b)4)-(5) (Supp. II
1992); infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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directed to Congress. Numerous Groups recommended that the
courts urge prompt action by the President to nominate, and
the Senate to confirm, appointees for existing judicial vacancies.59 Similarly, many Groups suggested that Congress seriously consider the impact of passing new legislation-particularly measures that create new civil causes of
action or that federalize additional criminal behavior-on
prompt, inexpensive civil dispute resolution. 0
3.

District Courts' Consideration of Advisory Groups'
Reports and Recommendations and the Courts'
Adoption of Civil Justice Plans

All of the federal districts seem to have considered carefully the reports and suggestions that their Advisory Groups
submitted. Most of the districts conferred closely with the
Groups, and a number of courts participated in meetings with
Group members to discuss the documents that they had developed.6 ' Most districts were very responsive to the reports and
recommendations, and some replied in writing to the suggestions, explaining why the judges adopted, modified or rejected
the proposals."
The benefits of this consideration and the adoption of
plans were similar to the advantages of the Groups' efforts.63
This certainly was true for courts that subscribed verbatim to
their Groups' recommendations, as numerous districts did.
More specifically, most of the courts that received modest sug-

" See, e.g., D. HAW. REPORT, supra note 39, at 35; N.D. IOWA REPORT, supra
note 56, at 9-10. See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection,
1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257. Numerous groups also recommended that the districts
be authorized to hire additional court personnel. See, e.g., E.D. KY. REPORT, supra
note 34, at 40-41; D.S.C. REPORT, supra note 50, at 72.
60 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. REPORT, supra note 43, at 38-43; M.D. PA. REPORT, supra note 57, at 72; see also 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1992).
" I premise these ideas on conversations with numerous judges, advisory group
members and reporters who participated in the meetings. See generally Tobias,
supra note 16, at 118.
62 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
ILLINOIS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 14-17, 19-21 (Dec.
27, 1991); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, App. 2 (Dec. 31,
1991) [hereinafter W.D. WIS. PLAN].
See supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
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gestions for modification in turn prescribed minimal change in
their plans." Even the numerous courts that adopted the recommendations only in part, however, seemed cognizant of the
problems in civil litigation.
Quite a few of the districts displayed sensitivity to both
procedural and substantive issues implicating courts' authority. For instance, a number of districts did not consider those
procedures that they included in plans to be self-executing.
Instead, the courts made them effective only after proposing
the promulgation of new, or the amendment of existing, local
rules and after considering public comment.65 Similarly, most
districts evinced equal caution in treating substantive questions that involved authority. Numerous courts carefully attempted to avoid the adoption of local procedures that conflicted with the Federal Rules,66 and some districts flatly refused
to promulgate inconsistent local procedures that Advisory
Groups had suggested." Moreover, a few courts crafted procedures in ways that minimized potential conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions."
When engaged in civil justice planning, the judges in a

'
See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 31, 1991); UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Dec. 16, 1991); see also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
Districts that received more comprehensive suggestions correspondingly adopted broader change. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 18,
1991); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 IN THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY 17-25 (Dec. 19, 1991); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
74 (Dec. 30, 1991).
6 See supra notes 5 & 41 and accompanying text.
6? See, e.g., W.D. WIS. PLAN, supra note 62, App. 2, at 2, 6; cf. UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE
AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 18 (Dec. 17, 1991) (asking whether district needs
specific power to impose compulsory, nonbinding court-annexed arbitration).
6 For example, the Oregon District adopted co-equal case assignment involving
Article III and magistrate judges but eschewed opt-out provisions which other
districts employ and, therefore, may violate 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1988). See UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5, 20 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter D. OR. PLAN]; see also
infra note 70 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 16, at 126.
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number of districts apparently made greater efforts than previously to consider the "courts qua courts." 9 One important
manifestation of this was the effort in some districts to treat
the Article III judges and the magistrate judges as similar
judicial officers for purposes of reducing expense and delay in
civil cases. For example, several districts provided for co-equal
assignment of civil lawsuits to Article III and magistrate judges.70 Other districts correspondingly assigned cases to particular judicial officers based on the suits' subject matter or on the
officers' specialized expertise.7
A small number of districts attempted to maximize procedural uniformity. The preeminent example of this phenomenon
is the intrastate uniformity that the Northern and Southern
Districts of Mississippi attained by promulgating a joint plan
with identical procedures." Other districts tried to promote a
related type of intrastate uniformity by modelling their local
requirements on analogous mechanisms applicable in the state
court systems where the districts are situated.7 3
Many districts prescribed numerous procedures that could
reduce cost or delay.7 4 Certain of the measures were novel or
comparatively untested, a number were based on the same or
similar mechanisms that had decreased expense or delay in

I am indebted to Donna Stienstra of the Federal Judicial Center, and John
Oakley, the Advisory Group Reporter for the Eastern District of California, for this
proposition.

70 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, CIVIL
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 3-4 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter D.
MONT. PLAN]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF

NORTH CAROLINA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 5 (Sept.
23, 1993) [hereinafter W.D.N.C. PLAN].
71 See, e.g., D. OR. PLAN, supra note 68, at 23; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY RE-

DUCTION PLAN 4-5 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter W.D. VA. PLAN]; see also supra note
43 and accompanying text.

72 See NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF MISSISSIPPI, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Oct. 1993); see also Stephen N. Subrin, The
New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981) (discussing intra-

state uniformity).
" See, e.g., W.D.N.C. PLAN, supra note 70, at 13-19 (premising mediation program on state effort); Telephone Interview with Wally Edgell, Clerk, United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia (Jan. 25, 1993) (premising settlement weeks on state court analogue); see also supra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text.
" Some of these were obviously identical or similar to those that groups recommended. See also supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
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other districts or in the state courts, and a majority were premised on the CJRA's principles, guidelines and techniques.
Illustrative of relatively untested procedures that were meant
to limit litigation expenses directly was the imposition of ceilings on contingency fees in the Eastern District of Texas.75
The Montana District's provision for co-equal assignment of
cases to Article III and magistrate judges, which permits parties to opt-out, is another measure which had received practically no prior experimentation.76 An example of federal modelling was the decision of the Western District of North Carolina
to incorporate in its plan a procedure analogous to the Montana co-equal assignment system.7 7 An illustration of state
borrowing was the Northern District of West Virginia's prescription of settlement weeks similar to those already employed in the state court system.78
Virtually every district adopted some of the enumerated
principles, guidelines and techniques, and an overwhelming
majority prescribed procedures for case management, discovery
and ADR. Numerous districts instituted case management
schemes, most of which contemplated close judicial management through judicial conferences and other techniques. For
instance, the Maine District's plan contemplates exacting judicial supervision of all cases, which are assigned to tracks by
case-type and degree of complexity.7 9
Many districts are employing a plethora of discovery reforms, nearly all of which are premised on the new revisions of
the Federal Rules or on the eleven congressionally prescribed
procedures. For instance, most of the EIDCs and some of the
remaining courts adopted different forms of automatic disclosure.s" Numerous districts correspondingly imposed presump-

" See E.D. TEX. PLAN, supra note 11, at 7-8. See generally Tobias, supra note
16, at 125.
" See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
1 Id. The examples in this paragraph are obviously not exhaustive.
78 See supra note 73.
79 See COST AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 2-3,
App. A (Aug. 1, 1993) [hereinafter D. ME. PLAN]. Numerous other districts are
implementing similar permutations and combinations which typically involve close
management and tracks. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE' AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 1-5
(Jan. 1, 1993); W.D. VA. PLAN, supra note 71, at 1-2.
" See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE,
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tive numerical limitations on interrogatories or depositions, 81
although quite a few courts had prescribed these restrictions
before Congress enacted the CJRA.8"
A substantial number of districts are experimenting with a
broad array of alternatives to dispute resolution, including
arbitration, mediation, ENE, settlement weeks and settlement
conferences and summary jury trials and minitrials.5 ' The
Western District of Missouri comprehensively and carefully
initiated an early assessment program in which one-third of
the civil cases are automatically assigned to some form of ADR
and many of the rest are encouraged to participate." Several
districts implemented or are considering settlement offer requirements that resemble a proposal for amending Federal
Rule 68, which the Advisory Committee has been evaluat85
ing.
4.

Oversight of Civil Justice Reform

The process for monitoring civil justice planning prescribed
in the CJRA had several beneficial aspects.' Some Circuit

CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2-3 (Dec. 23, 1991); REPORT
AND PLAN OF THE ADvIsoRY GROUP OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 36-37 (Dec. 23, 1991); see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., D. MONT. PLAN, supra note 70, at 16; W.D. VA. PLAN, supra note
71, at 2; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK, CIvIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 17, 1991)
[hereinafter E.D.N.Y. PLAN]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
WYOMING, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 31, 1991);

see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 202026 (1989).
'3 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 23-25 (May 14,
1993); W.D.N.C. PLAN, supra note 70, at 13-19.
84 See United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Early
Assessment Program, Court-Approved General Order (Oct. 31, 1991). See generally
Tobias, supra note 48, at 348-54.
85 See, e.g., E.D. TEX. PLAN, supra note 11, at 10; UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, App. A (July 14, 1993); see also William W Schwarzer,

Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation,
76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
88 For descriptions of the monitoring process, see Tobias, supra note 6; Tobias,
supra note 4, at 1403-13.
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Review Committees rigorously analyzed and made constructive
suggestions for change in the plans that districts developed.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit Committee scrutinized all of
the plans that the seven EIDCs had promulgated and recommended modifications in most of them."7 A few districts altered their procedures in response to these suggestions, and a
number of the remainder seriously reconsidered the mechanisms questioned."
The Judicial Conference Case Management Committee
correspondingly recommended that some courts revise or reexamine certain features of their plans. For example, the Committee recommended that the Connecticut District implement
several changes in the plan that it had adopted during the
summer of 1993.9 The court decided to treat that document as
a proposal and instituted numerous modifications which were
responsive to the Judicial Conference's concerns."
5.

Implementation
Assessments

With Emphasis

on Annual

Several reasons make it difficult to offer more than preliminary observations about whether civil justice reform has reduced expense or delay in civil litigation. A majority of the
districts issued civil justice plans only in 1993, and many published them as recently as November. Moreover, some of the
EIDCs made the procedures in their plans effective as late as
mid-1992. Furthermore, relatively few EIDCs have completed
comprehensive annual assessments which evaluate the effectiveness of their procedures in decreasing expense or delay.
Nonetheless, some general, tentative ideas can be afforded.

87 See REPORT OF NINTH CRcuIT REVIEW COMMITrEE (Apr. 14, 1992).

"' See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Miscellaneous General Order No. 638, Amendment No. 1 (Apr. 27, 1992); cf Carl Tobias,
Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal District, 53 MONT. L. REV. 239, 244
(1992) (discussing Montana District's reconsideration of procedures prescribed).
'9 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (June 1993); see also Telephone Interview with Mark Shapiro, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Court Administrative Division (Dec. 1, 1993).
o See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT,
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (Nov. 1993); see also Telephone Interview, supra note 89.
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Many districts seem to have implemented civil justice
reform carefully, and a number of courts have instituted efforts
to inform the legal profession about their reform endeavors.
For example, the districts have sponsored continuing legal
education programs and have circulated to practitioners copies
of the new procedures, often emphasizing the availability of
particular measures, such as expedited tracks, automatic disclosure and ADR options."'
Numerous mechanisms, including most of the broader
reforms in case management, discovery and ADR that courts
employed are apparently functioning smoothly. In fact, some
procedures are apparently reducing cost or delay. For example,
the division of the Montana District, which is using the opt-out
mechanism, seems to be securing more consents to magistrate
judge jurisdiction than the divisions that are not, thereby saving the time of Article III judges.92 Moreover, close judicial
case management in that court and the Northern District of
Ohio has reduced expense and delay somewhat.9 '
Anecdotal evidence from several districts that have employed the controversial automatic disclosure technique indicates that the procedure is working rather well, particularly in
non-complex cases once lawyers become accustomed to the
mechanism." It remains unclear, however, whether the measure generally effects savings in time or money or whether it
operates efficaciously in complex litigation.95
Certain ADR procedures that many districts have institut-

91 See, e.g., D. ME. PLAN, supra note 79, at 2-3 (calling for more educational
programs); CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN AND RELATED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA (Apr. 1992) (circulating pamphlet including
new procedures to bar).
92 These are the preliminary results of the court's statistical analysis of the
docket. Telephone Interview with Jeremiah Lynch, Law Clerk, Chief Judge Paul
Hatfield (Dec. 1, 1993).
93 Id.; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO,
ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKET 1 (Jan. 29, 1993) [hereinaf-

ter N.D. OHIO ASSESSMENT]; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
94 These ideas are premised on telephone interviews with numerous practitio-

ners and other individuals familiar with automatic disclosure in the Districts of
Arizona, Northern California, Massachusetts and Montana.
"9 See supra note 94; see also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1992); Ralph I, Winter,
Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 268 (1992).
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ed seem to be yielding benefits. The early assessment program
in the Western District of Missouri has been able to increase
the percentage of cases that are submitted to some form of
ADR and that are settled, thus saving time and money of the
judicial officers, attorneys and parties.96 The plethora of possibilities that the Northern District of California affords has
apparently prompted a greater number of, and earlier, settlements.9 7
Some EIDCs have performed comprehensive, careful annual assessments." The evaluation process generally helped reassure a number of districts that their procedural choices to
prescribe or eschew specific measures were reasonable. Indeed,
the Kansas District derived valuable information from comparing its results with those achieved by numerous "peer
courts."9 9 Compilation of the analyses similarly enabled a few
districts to learn that particular procedures were unworkable
or ineffective and thus, to recalibrate them. 0'
Finally, several districts capitalized on the opportunity
that the reform's implementation provided to review and revamp their local rules.' ' Compliance with certain reporting
requirements imposed by the CJRA or the districts generally

'6 See KENT SNAPP & DAVIS LOUPE, 1992 EARLY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM REPORT
(Jan. 26, 1993); see also Tobias, supra note 48, at 352-54.
" Telephone Interview with Richard L. Marcus, Advisory Group Reporter,
Northern District of California (Feb. 23, 1994); see also UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-17 (Dec. 1991); see also Marcus, supra note 9, at 819
n.242.
'8 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY,
ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
(Dec. 1992) [hereinafter N.J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT]; N.D. OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra
note 93.
" See ANNUAL ASSESSMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF THE
STATE OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL DOCKETS AND OF THE CJRA EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN OF THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (July 9, 1993).
' See N.J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 98, at 20 (deleting requirement for
preparation of joint discovery plans in non-complex cases); United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, General Order No. 92-23 Amending Article
Four, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan (Oct. 29, 1992) (omitting
procedure that proved unworkable); Telephone Interview with Ronald Lawson,
Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
(Jan. 20, 1993) (district undertaking fundamental revision of local rules).
1o1See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 6 (1993); see Interview, supra note
100.
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seems to have had beneficial effects. More specifically, the
requirements have apparently encouraged numerous judges to
initiate special efforts 10 2that expedited the resolution of civil
cases on their dockets.

B. Ancillary Beneficial Aspects of the PlanningProcess
Many somewhat less direct benefits have attended the
process of civil justice planning. When Congress passed the
CJRA, it probably did not foresee or consciously intend that a
number of these specific advantages would directly result from
the planning endeavors, although the benefits could prove to
be among the most salutary effects of the reform effort.
The CJRA instituted an unprecedented nation-wide selfanalysis by the federal trial courts. The districts have amassed
a wealth of invaluable information on their functioning, institutions, personnel, procedures and local legal cultures. The
collection, evaluation and synthesis of this material within
specific districts among courts and nationally should increase
immeasurably the understanding of federal civil litigation in
the late twentieth century.
This massive planning effort has helped to focus attention
on the needs, problems, operations and priorities of the federal
courts. The passage of the CJRA and its implementation have
correspondingly promoted healthy dialogue between the federal
judiciary and Congress. That discussion has encompassed numerous facets of the civil justice system, including the optimal
number of federal judges, the purposes of the courts, the resources available for, and required to administer, the courts,
and the importance of cooperation between Congress and the
judiciary. Civil justice planning has also fostered valuable
interchange between these two branches and other entities
responsible for the courts' operation, such as the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.
"u Interviews with numerous individuals familiar with civil justice reform indicate that numerous judges have employed additional personnel, moved older cases
to the front of the queue or taken other measures to avoid the embarrassment of
appearing to have backlogs. See generally R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. Pirr. L. REV.
687 (1993).
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There has been instructive exchange among and within
the ninety-four districts. For instance, each of the districts has
opened and expanded communications with numerous other
courts, especially contiguous districts or ones located in the
same state, and with the state judiciary. The bench, bar, court
personnel and litigants in every court have engaged in salutary
dialogue regarding the district. These interactions have improved communications and enhanced appreciation of the federal trial courts.
Civil justice planning has beneficially affected procedural
experimentation, particularly relating to civil rule revision. For
example, the experience with the 1993 federal discovery
amendments and their integration with civil justice reforms
implicating discovery has informed comprehension of the national rule revision process, the interface between those procedures and local rule amendment and the need for federal and
local consistency. Implementation of the CJRA has concomitantly required that numerous districts adopt new, or revise
existing, local rules. In short, these efforts have provided helpful insights on experimentation with the national and local
amendment processes which Congress instituted in the 1988
Judicial Improvements Act."0 3
Finally, the testing of various mechanisms has improved
understanding of how to experiment in ways that will promote
the discovery and implementation of the most efficacious procedures.'04 Indeed, the ninety-four districts comprise highly effective laboratories of experimentation. The districts have afforded the requisite diversity, in terms of geography, caseload,
local legal cultures and procedures, to offer a valuable foundation from which to extrapolate vis-a-vis numerous phenomena
that are critical to federal civil procedure.
Many of the developments described above ultimately
should foster the adoption of the best procedures for treating
modern federal civil litigation. These will involve and affect the
institutions responsible for facilitating civil dispute resolution
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (Supp. II 1992). See generally Mullenix, supra note
For valuable discussions of experimentation, see A. Leo Levin, Local Rules
as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991)
and Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfor Restricted Field
35.

104

Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1988).
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and change in civil procedure, such as Congress, the federal
courts and the Civil Rules Committee, the specific measures,
including Federal and local rules, and the individuals involved
in civil suits, namely judges, attorneys and parties.
CONCLUSION

Civil justice reform under the CJRA has afforded a number of benefits, although some disadvantages have accompanied statutory implementation. Congress, the federal judiciary,
and federal court practitioners and litigants now must capitalize on the beneficial aspects of civil justice reform by promoting the most effective features and by deemphasizing the least
efficacious ones. Careful continuation of the reform initiative
should eventually lead to the finest procedures for resolving
civil litigation in the next century.

